The case for the UK to consider a new approach to Asymmetric Warfare
Asymmetric Warfare refers to unconventional strategies and tactics adopted when the military capabilities of belligerent powers are so different that they cannot make the same sorts of attacks on each other, typically guerrilla warfare and terrorist tactics. The information age and the democratisation of technology has given our adversaries affordable opportunities to find an edge in new ways, such as orchestrated disinformation, cyber attacks, technologically enabled economic warfare (cyber crime), public health (e.g. China’s failure to stop the flow of fentanyl precursors into the United States) and other factors.
This paper explores what an incoming Government could do, within the constraints of budget and public accountability to address the challenges and take the opportunities that this situation presents.
While the challenge is great, the UK enjoys an academic, engineering and technological advantage. If the UK can tap into this resource, we will be able to get and stay ahead.
Experimentation. One partial mitigation might be to support small projects with no specific outcome. Establishing such projects in key technologies could keep the UK at the leading edge of materials, additive manufacture, uncrewed vehicles, artificial intelligence etc.
Leverage the ‘Citizen Army’. While military recruitment is proving to be fiendishly difficult, the UK could better encourage and support its citizen army, to conduct operations in the national interest in areas such as cyber and information; as Russia and Ukraine have already done. For the UK to achieve the same would require some careful moral and safety considerations but it could be highly effective if managed correctly. Prize giving and incentives, e.g. the XPrize Foundation and Earthshot Prize, could play a part in this by stimulating the required activity without the need for formal contracts and programmes.
Leverage External Investment. The appetite for investment in Defence seems to be increasing with a number of new defence and security focused funds emerging. However, like the MOD’s own innovation landscape, the defence and security investment landscape is complex and fragmented. A fund of funds that brings together a number of interested investors may, enable the UK to deliver more ambitious projects and better help security related businesses scale.
Understand latent opportunities in the Industrial Base. The UK’s manufacturing capacity is significantly smaller now than it was in the run up to and during WWII. Even then, large segments of industry were turned to the war effort, the story of the Mosquito, being partially produced by the furniture industry, providing an excellent case study. While it would probably not be publicly acceptable to start retooling the UK’s job-shops just yet, conducting some research to find out where such opportunities lie for modern technologies might be prudent.
Transform What we buy. Uncrewed vehicles are proving to be decisive on the battlefield in Ukraine and the Red Sea and innovation is happening here, perhaps, even faster than in AI. However, MOD capability lines and the defence industry have been slow it pick up on the demand signal. While advanced military equipment will continue to have an important role on the battlefield, we must urgently rebalance expenditure on exotic and expensive platforms with the industrial-scale production of cheap, numerous uncrewed and semi-autonomous systems.
Transform How we buy. The existing rules and regulations are not fit for rapid, agile, procurement of military capabilities and must be overhauled. The goal must be a Defence procurement system that is able to rapidly start, stop and change projects as the demands of the environment change. This will require the combined efforts of the Treasury, MOD and industry but is vital.
Broaden Concepts and Doctrine to encompass National Resilience. The UK must broaden its definition of warfare and acknowledge that it is under attack from multiple non-traditional directions. If the UK is not ready to take offensive action on these non-military fronts, it must at least understand them and defend itself. Much of military spending and effort is focussed on countering military might head on but we must also ensure that we are defending the critical aspects of our society across the whole spectrum of national resilience. The concept of national resilience has been embraced by the Imperial College Institute for Security Science and Technology (ISST), their new Centre for Active Resilience (CARS) and NATO’s Defence Innovation Accelerator for the North Atlantic (DIANA) which are worth exploring.
Build on existing strengths. Build on the expertise and excellence of UK Special Forces, the Nation’s original asymmetric force.
Invest in Skills. We must invest in the skills that are going to keep us at the forefront. E.g.
Secure Over-the-Horizon Command and Control
Autonomous Systems
Artificial Intelligence
Cyber
Space
Quantum
Fusion/Miniaturised Fusion
A new approach to combating disinformation. The information age has produced tools perfectly suited to assist Russia’s employment of ‘Maskirovka’. Although these tools were largely developed in the West, Russia, and now China, Iran and North Korea, use them to exploit Western openness and adherence to balanced reporting. Today, with messages transferring informally and in near-real-time, a faster, more aggressive diplomatic cadence is required. Perhaps something more akin to Finland’s War on Fake News.
Keep the moral high ground. It could be argued that some of today’s conflicts are, in part, the result of Western lapses of morality. So, it is vital that we avoid a race to the moral bottom.
Although our adversaries seem happy to use amorality to gain an ephemeral advantage, morality is a long-term asymmetric advantage. Humanity has an innate sense of right, wrong and what is good for the functioning of society. By being seen to be moral, we can garner and maintain national and international public support. Morality need not be a blocker to adopting technologies or techniques and if we invest correctly, it will be possible to be safe, humane and effective.
Conclusion
The ubiquity of technology means that state and non-state actors alike now have unprecedented opportunities to seize advantage, on and off the battlefield. As the UK can no longer rely on might and wealth, we, like our adversaries, will have to tap into these opportunities to find creative ways to stay ahead.
Opportunities for asymmetric warfare are no longer limited to guerrilla tactics. This requires us to adopt a broader definition of warfare and to innovate across the full spectrum of national resilience. Whoever adapts fastest and most efficiently is likely to succeed in war and in the sphere of Great Power Competition.
The UK’s incredible industrial and educational heritage provides us with an excellent base to build on and benefits from a rich history of discovering advantage from a starting point of weakness. There is every reason to believe that, if correctly employed and incentivised, the UK will be able to use its intellectual, industrial and military prowess to find a 21st century edge.
It is not the capabilities fielded on day-one that dictate the outcome of a conflict, it is the ability to identify and exploit asymmetric advantage that will ultimately decide the victor.
Disclaimer
This document was written without formal access to the MOD and security agencies and was compiled from open sources and personal experience. Consequently, the concerns raised and recommendations made here may already have been addressed or over taken by events. Further to that, events are moving so quickly that the material and reference here could be added to or replaced on an almost daily basis, which in itself, underlines the need for pace and agility.